The security advisory business must be getting desperate.
Evidence: this latest Shell Shock bug. Security vendors and the media are making it out to be a serious threat to every organization. Organizations are in a panic, asking every software and services vendor to confirm that their solutions are either unaffected or patched.
Lets break down this bug, shall we?
- Bash is a command shell. It is the Unix/Linux equivalent to cmd.exe
- There is a bug in Bash – it has likely been there for years. With
this bug, the contents of an environment variable are executed, though
they should not be.
As a user, I use Bash daily. With this exploit, I can get Bash to run programs as me. Hmm. I do that anyways. Not much of an exploit. I can’t gain new privileges – just cause it to do stuff that it would do anyways.
So what’s the problem? Well, what if I can get another program, which normally does run bash, to run it with my commands. OK, that’s more interesting. It would then get that other program to run things on my behalf – a legitimate exploit.
But what programs run bash?
Mostly sshd. SSH is the program I use to connect to another computer on the network. Usually, I sign into sshd with my own account (ID/password or public/private key). The ssh daemon (sshd) then runs bash and lets me type commands to run on the remote computer. Great. With this Bash bug I can … get bash to do illicitly what it already does for me. So what? So nothing.
What else? Well, in rather unusual circumstances, you can configure sshd to run just a few, limited commands on behalf of many people. For example, I might setup an account on a firewall called ‘monitor’, set a password on the account, configure it to only show firewall log records and nothing else, and share that account with many people. In this context, people who do have legitimate access to the ‘monitor’ account would be able to break out of the ‘command jail’ and run more commands on the firewall. This is an actual vulnerability, but not a major one — after all, ‘monitor’ is likely not all that privileged an account, and these are people I gave a password to in the first place, so hopefully they won’t do anything naughty.
The big fear is that there are web exploits. The idea here is that someone writes a web application in Bash. Now that’s just bizarre – using a command shell to provide content to a web site. In this case, anyone who can connect to the web site could cause the command shell to run arbitrary commands. Again, these commands would run as the web server’s designated user ID (usually a very unprivileged account), but in this case, a more serious exploit, because the set of possible attackers is large and they could come from anywhere. OK – now we’re talking about a real security problem, but wait – who writes web applications in Bash anyways? It turns out, almost nobody. It’s just not the right tool for the job. That’s like asking: “who hammers nails with a screw driver?” I’m sure it happens, not it’s not exactly easy to do and is therefore unusual.
Bottom line: this ‘Shell Shock’ security bug is a legitimate security bug, but with near-zero impact in the wild.
So why all the panic?
It must have been a slow news week last week.