Posts Tagged ‘network security’

Appliances are Dangerous (because nobody patches them)

Tuesday, May 26th, 2015

Putting sensitive infrastructure on physical or virtual appliances, rather than running it as a traditional on-premise application or a newer software-as-a-service system is a security disaster just waiting to happen.

Why? Because unlike on-premise applications and also unlike the servers running SaaS applications, there is no guarantee that anyone will apply critical security patches to your appliances, either at all or on time. Systems with unpatched security vulnerabilities are an open door to your otherwise secure infrastructure. Tolerate them at your peril.

I just recently spoke with a customer of ours who had – a few years ago – deployed a privileged access management product from one of our competitors. That product includes one or more “jump servers” which mediate login sessions from the desktops of authorized users to logins on managed endpoint systems. Such a “jump server” architecture is common in the privileged access management product category.

The problem for this customer has been that these jump servers — which have access to the most sensitive passwords in the company — run on the original Windows 2008 Server OS (i.e., before the first service pack was released). Since the vendor has made custom changes to the OS to “harden” it, it has been impossible to patch the OS on these jump servers. As a result, today, these jump servers run an OS that was released on February 27, 2008. The OS was released 2,645 days ago. 7.25 years ago. Our customer is scrambling to rip out this product, which endangers their entire infrastructure (it also has performance problems, but that’s another story).

Just think about how many security exploits have been discovered for and patched on Windows 2008+IIS since this platform was released on 2008-02-27. This recently discovered vulnerability comes to mind:


Using this particularly dangerous vulnerability, an attacker can remotely gain full SYSTEM privileges on any Windows system running IIS. Yup – including Windows 2008. This exploit is being actively leveraged in the wild, so the risk is very real.

Imagine that your privileged access management system — or any other critical infrastucture — runs on an old, unpatched OS like this. How secure would your organization be?

Is it ever OK to use appliances — physical or virtual — instead of just installing software on a well managed OS image?

I can think of only two cases where appliances are acceptable:

  1. Physical appliances which incorporate specialized hardware, to perform some task very fast. There is simply no software alternative to custom ASICs.
  2. Appliances (physical or virtual) with an automatically managed patch system. i.e., they should run a stock OS and be subject to automatic and timely patches from all the software vendors that contributed components: OS, web server, app server, DB, etc.:
    • If human intervention is required to patch, you’re likely going to forget or at least be late, which will create windows of opportunity for attackers: no good.
    • If only some components get automatically patched (say just the OS), it follows that others aren’t being patched (say the app server) and again you’ll be vulnerable.
    • If the runtime platform has been significantly customized (i.e., “hardened”) then automatic patching will likely break and you’ll achieve insecurity by trying to be too clever.

What if you’ve already deployed appliances that aren’t automatically patched?

  1. Try to patch them manually. Right now.
  2. Talk to the vendor. They are putting you at risk and had better step up and correct the error of their ways, or else you’ll be obliged to rip out their products.
  3. Look for alternatives, since these things are ticking time bombs on your infrastructure.