Posts Tagged ‘security compromise’

Advanced search in an IAM system: a privacy threat

Monday, September 15th, 2014

XKCD posted an amusing comic about the intersection of SQL and data privacy a while ago, here – xkcd.com/1409/.

This is interesting in that it highlights the threat to privacy by an innocuous seeming search feature. Never mind the SQL syntax in the comic – imagine that you can search for users whose ‘scheduled term date’ is in the next 30 days, or whose ‘most recent performance review’ was a low grade. Even if the IAM system refuses to show you the values of those fields, the presence or absence of a user in a search result set would compromise privacy and possibly corporate security.

What to do?

You have two options:

  • Eliminate search on sensitive attributes entirely; or
  • Ensure that the IAM system filters out search results which were included on the basis of the values of sensitive attributes.

I imagine that most IAM products and deployments out there opt for the former. You can’t search on ‘scheduled term date’ and the like. That’s fine – it’s safe, I guess, but it’s also extremely limiting. What if, as a manager, I want to run that query and see which of my subordinates, some of which are contractors, are about to reach the end of their work term? I might then wish to request extensions for some of them, because their projects are still active. Alternately, I might request to turn some contractors into employees.

In other words, simply refusing to search on these things is not a satisfactory solution – it leaves out too much useful functionality.

That brings us to the second option — build a search engine smart enough to figure that a given record should not be included in the result set because this particular requester should not be able to see the sensitive attribute value for this particular user. That’s hard, but creates much more value for the end user.

This is the approach we opted for at Hitachi ID. Hopefully our customers like it. 😉